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NOTE
IN RE WATER OF HALLETT CREEK SYSTEM
243 Cal. Rptr. 887, cert. denied sub. nom. California v. United
States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988).
INTRODUCTION
In In re Water of Hallett Creek System (Hallett Creek), the California
Supreme Court held that on federal reserved lands, the United States has
state riparian water rights to be used for secondary purposes.' The court
held that, although federal law does not grant reserved water rights on
federal lands for secondary purposes, California state law does allow such
use of water through the doctrine of riparian rights.' To reach this con-
clusion, the court recognized that the United States retains common law
water rights which vested at the time the western territories became states
and adopted the common law.' Thus, the court concluded that the United
States never severed its common law rights to water on federal reserved
lands.4
The Hallett Creek court acknowledged United States v. New Mexico,5
in which the United States Supreme Court held that a grant of water for
secondary purposes on federal reserved lands was not subject to the
reservation doctrine. The reservation doctrine allows the federal govern-
ment to impliedly reserve from state control sufficient water to accomplish
the primary purpose of federal reserved land.6 The reservation doctrine
is an exception to Congress's long established rule of deferring to state
water law.7 Thus, the Court in United States v. New Mexico held that a
1. In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, cert. denied sub. nom. California
v. United States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988). Riparian water rights accord to the owner
of land bordering a watercourse the right to make reasonable use of water on that land. Id. at 889
n. 2. Federal reserved lands are lands which have been removed from the public domain for some
predetermined purpose (e.g., national forests, national parks, Indian reservations, military reser-
vations, etc ... ) by either statute, executive order or treaty. These lands are to be distinguished
from the public domain lands which are lands open to settlement, sale, or disposition under federal
public land laws. Id. at 890 n. 5 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443-44
(1955)). With respect to national forests, secondary purposes include everything that is not a primary
purpose. Primary purposes are defined as: I) preservation of timber, and 2) to secure favorable water
flows. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 708 n. 16 (1978) (quoting Department of
Interior Circular, 30 L.D. 23, 24 (1900)).
2. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 892-98.
3. Id. at 896.
4. Id. at 897-98.
5. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 6%.
6. Hallen Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 894 n. 10 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
700-02). The Reservation Doctrine is based on the property and supremacy clauses of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 889 n. 3 (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978)).
7. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
state's system of water allocation may deprive the United States of water
on federal reserved lands needed to accomplish secondary purposes.' In
addition, the Court noted that where water is required for secondary
purposes, the United States may acquire water in the same manner as
any other public or private appropriator pursuant to the law of the state
in which the reservation is situated.9 Relying on this language, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court reasoned that "[allthough the State of New Mexico
recognized only appropriative rights, the underlying principle of deference
to state law logitally extends to any water right recognized under local
law-including riparian rights.""0
This note analyzes the reasoning behind the Hallett Creek decision.
More importantly, it then focuses upon the potential impact of this decision
on other western states, especially those western states which recognized
common law groundwater rights at statehood.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August 1976, George Baily, a private water rights claimant, peti-
tioned the California State Water Board (Board) for a determination of
the rights of various claimants to the use of the waters of the Hallett
Creek System in Lassen County." In response, the Board commenced a
statutory adjudication of all water rights in the system. 2 One claimant
was the United States, acting on behalf of the United States Forest Service,
which administers the Plumas National Forest in Lassen County bordering
Hallett Creek. ' The United States claimed two kinds of rights for the
use of this water: 1) reserved water rights under federal law for primary
national forest purposes, and 2) riparian water rights under California
law for secondary national forest purposes.
The Board then issued its findings and determinations declaring and
quantifying the rights of the claimants. The Board granted the United
States' claim for a reserved water right for primary purposes, but denied
the United States' claim for a riparian water right for secondary purposes. 4
The Board based its conclusions on the fact that under California law the
8. Id. at 707- 18.
9. Id. at 702-03.
10. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94 (emphasis in original).
11. Matter of Hallett Creek Stream System, 232 Cal. Rptr. 208, 209 (Cal. App. 3d 1986), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, In Re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988). Under
California law the Board is authorized, upon application of a claimant, to conduct a statutory water
rights proceeding to adjudicate the rights of all water users in a stream system. Cal. Water Code
§§ 2500-2900 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989). Matter of Hallett Creek, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10 n. 1.
12. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 889-90.
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United States is not entitled to riparian rights or, in the alternative, Con-
gress has voluntarily severed any such riparian rights through the enact-
ment of the Mining Act of 1866 and the Desert Land Act of 1877. ' As
required by the California statute, the Board then filed its determinations
in the Lassen County Superior Court for a de novo review. 6
The superior court reversed the Board's determinations, holding the
United States has the same riparian rights as any other ordinary land-
owner. ' 7 The court further ruled that Congress has not severed the United
States' riparian rights which could be used for secondary purposes. 8 The
State of California, acting on behalf of the Board, then appealed.' 9
The California Court of Appeals upheld the superior court's ruling
concerning riparian rights under California law, but held that those rights
are subordinate to the rights of subsequent appropriators.2' In other words,
those rights must be regarded as secondary to all other approved uses."
The State filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court,
asserting the appellate court erred in holding that the United States has
riparian rights.22 The United States and the Sierra Club, which had suc-
cessfully intervened on behalf of the United States at the superior court
level, also petitioned for review, claiming the court of appeals erred in
holding that the United States' riparian rights are automatically subor-
dinated. 23
The California Supreme Court granted the petitions for review and
affirmed the appellate decision holding that the United States has riparian
rights for secondary purposes.24 The court reversed the decision on the
issue of whether those rights are subordinate to subsequent appropriative
users. 25 The court held that the Desert Land Act, which subordinates
federal water rights, does not apply to reserved lands.26 The court also
ruled that since the United States' riparian water rights are "unexercised,"
the United States must apply to the Board or superior court prior to
exercising such rights.27
The state of California subsequently petitioned the United States Su-
15. Id.; Mining Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 251-53 as amended, 43 U.S.C. §661 (1982); Desert Land
Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. §§321-23 (1982).
16. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90. See Cal. Water Code § 2750 (West Supp. 1989).
17. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
18. id.
19. Id.
20. Matter of Hallett Creek Stream System, 232 Cal. Rptr. 208, 216-17 (Cal. App. 3d 1986),
aff'd in part rev'd in part, In Re Water of Hallet Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988).
21. Id. at 217.
22. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 890, 898-900.
27. Id. at 900-01.
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preme Court on a writ of certiorari to review this decision. The United
States Supreme Court denied the writ in October 1988.2"
BACKGROUND
The United States became the owner of much of the land in the western
United States in 1848 pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.29
This land then became part of the public domain.3" As owner of the public
domain, the United States was also owner of all the natural resources
that were associated with these territories. The United States exercised
the English Property Rule of Absolute Ownership holding an absolute
right to surface waters, groundwaters, timber, rocks, minerals and the
soil which comprised the public domain. 3 As western settlement grew,
the United States disposed portions of its land to private persons, but
took no action with respect to water.32 Consequently, these gold miners,
squatters and settlers took from the federal lands what water they needed. 3
By taking no action, the United States implicitly recognized these pos-
sessory rights by permitting these people to divert water from the streams
on public lands to operate mines and mills, and to irrigate lands.' This
time is commonly referred to as the United States period of "silent ac-
quiescence" with respect to water.35
In an effort to protect the rights of these appropriators, Congress passed
the Mining Act of 1866.36 The act "'maintained and protected' the vested
rights of the water users, 'whenever, by priority of possession, rights to
the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other pur-
poses, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and ac-
knowledged by the local customs, laws and decisions of the courts.'"3'
In sum, Congress recognized the prior appropriation doctrine and deferred
to state or local law for its application.
In 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land Act, which was an attempt
to encourage settlement in the arid West." This act provided in pertinent
28. California v. United States, - U.S. - 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988).
29. See IV Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaeda at 764 (15th ed. 1983); see also F. Trelease,
Federal-State Relations in Water Law (National Water Commission Report NWC-L-71-014 1971)
at 111, and Matter of Hallett Creek Stream System, 232 Cal. Rptr. 208, 215 (Cal. App. 3d 1986),
aff'd in part rev'd in part, In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988).
30. F Trelease, supra note 29 at I 11.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id. at I11-12.
34. Id. at 112.
35. Id. at I 1l; In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 897 cert. denied sub.
nor. California v. United States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988).
36. Mining Act of 1866, 14 Stat, 251 as amended, 43 U.S.C. §661 (1982).
37. F. Trelease, supra note 29 at 112.
38. Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. §§321-23 (1982). The Desert Land Act
applies to the following states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
(Vol. 30
IN RE WATER OF HALLETT CREEK SYSTEM
part that "'all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation
and use, together with the the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources
of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain
and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation,
mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights."' 39 The
United States sold arid land, at a very low cost, to those people who
reclaimed it by irrigation. The right to use water depended upon the local
laws of prior appropriation. The United States Supreme Court has sub-
sequently held that the Desert Land Act severed water not previously
appropriated from the public domain itself.'
The Reservation Doctrine
The reservation doctrine provides that when the United States reserves
part of public domain lands for purposes of its own, it reserves water
sufficient for that purpose." The doctrine applies primarily to nonnavig-
able water and is based on the property and supremacy clauses of the
United States Constitution.42 The United States Supreme Court first al-
luded to the reservation doctrine in 1899 in United States v. Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Company.43 The issue in this case was whether an
irrigation company, acting under state authorization, could substantially
diminish the navigability of a river." The Court held that the state au-
thorization was limited by the federal government's superior power over
navigable waters.4 In dicta the Court supported its holding by alluding
to the existence of the reservation doctrine:
[ln the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner
of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters;
so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the
government property.'
The doctrine was first applied in 1908 in Winters v. United States.47
The dispute originated in the Milk River Valley of northern Montana
where Congress had established the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. 4
39. F Trelease, supra note 29 at 113.
40. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158, 164
(1935); In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 896-97 cert. denied sub. norm.
California v. United States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988).
41. Cappaern v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1975); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
6% (1978).
42. Halleu Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n. 3 (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645,
662 (1978)).
43. 174 U.S. 690 (1898).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 703.
46. Id.
47. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
48. Id. at 565.
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The objective of the reservation was to transform nomadic people into
farmers; consequently, a large irrigation diversion on the Milk River was
constructed.49 Upstream settlers, however, had previously constructed
diversions on the Milk River. As a result of a drought, the settlers were
in a position to deplete the entire river. On behalf of the Assiniboine and
Gros Ventre Tribes, the United States sought a restraining order to prohibit
the settlers' diversions." The settlers argued that according to the laws
of Montana they had a prior appropriative right to their use of the water.5
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, relying on the Rio Grande
decison.52 It ruled that when the United States created the reservation, it
reserved for the use of the Indian farmers water that had a priority date
relating back to the creation of the reservation.53 This became a well-
known and accepted doctrine of water law, but was thought to be appli-
cable only to Indian reservations.'
In 1955, however, the application of the reservation doctrine was ex-
panded to non-Indian federal reservations by the United States Supreme
Court in Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon (the Pelton Dam case). 55 In
Pelton Dam, the Federal Power Commission issued a license to a private
power company to construct a dam across the nonnavigable Deschutes
River. Relying on the Mining Act of 1866 and the Desert Land Act of
1877, the state of Oregon objected, claiming the United States gave
control over nonnavigable western streams to the states.'6 Oregon argued
that the structure would prevent salmon and trout from ascending the
river for spawning. The Court, however, pointed out that the dam was
to be constructed on reserved lands, and reserved lands were exempt from
the Desert Land Act and Mining Acts." Consequently, the Court held
that the project could be built and the water impounded without the consent
of the state or compliance with Oregon laws, simply because the dam
was built on reserved lands.5" Notwithstanding that there was no actual
water allocation in this case, an uncertainty passed through the western
states because the decision jeopardized state enforced water rights over
nonnavigable waters.59
49. Id. at 566-67.
50. Id. at 565.
51. Id. at 568-69.
52. id. at 577.
53. Id. at 573-77; see F. Trelease, supra note 29 at 105. In Winters the court relied also on United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), which supports the notion that the Indians themselves
reserved all rights not ceded to the United States. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
54. See Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters, 199 (1983); F. Trelease, supra note 29
at 105.
55. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
56. Id. at 446-47.
57. Id. at 446-48. One wing of the dam would sit on an Indian reservation, while the other wing
would sit on federal reserved land set aside for energy power purposes. Id. at 438-39.
58. Id. at 444-48.
59. Dunbar, supra note 54 at 199-200.
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Not until 1963 in Arizona v. California' did the United States Supreme
Court actually allow an allocation of water for reserved lands other than
Indian reservations. The state of Arizona initiated this suit to allocate the
waters of the Colorado River. The United States intervened and claimed
water for several types of reserved lands.6 The Court, relying largely on
Winters, re-emphasized the United States' authority to reserve water suf-
ficient for the present and future requirements of these reservations.62
According to one commentator, "'[the worst fears of the westerners had
come true; federal administrative control of water . . . [had been] sub-
stituted for the appropriation system of. . . [water]. . . rights." 63 States
feared that the United States could intervene at any time to claim water
for federal reservations which would disrupt those rights of prior appro-
priators.
Finally, in United States v. New Mexico, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the amount of water reserved and the purposes
for which the water may be used on federal reservations.'M In this case,
the United States claimed reserved water rights for use in the Gila National
Forest. The United States sought to quantify this right for secondary
national forest purposes described as wildlife preservation, recreation,
aesthetics, and cattle grazing. Citing Winters and Arizona v. California,
the Court concluded the United States reserved sufficient water to achieve
the primary purposes for which the reservation was created. Next, the
Court reviewed the legislative debates surrounding the Organic Act of
189765 and other legislation and determined that Congress intended na-
tional forests to be reserved for only two primary purposes.' These
purposes are: 1) to conserve the water flow, and 2) to furnish a continuous
supply of timber. Consequently, the Court held that Congress, in deference
to state water law, intended that water would be reserved only where
necessary to achieve the primary purposes for which the national forest
system was created.67 However, the Court also reasoned that where water
is necessary for secondary purposes, the United States may acquire water
in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
68
60. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
61. Id. at 595. The reservations included five Indian reservations, Lake Mead National Recreation
Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the
Gila National Forest. Id. at 601.
62. id.; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
63. Dunbar, supra note 54 at 201 (quoting F. Trelease, supra note 29 at 86).
64. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
65. Id. at 706-14; Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34, (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 473, 482 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) ); see Department of Interior Circular, 30 L.D. 23,
24 (1900) which states "public forest reservations are established to protect and improve the forests
for the purpose of securing a permanent supply of timber ... and ... insuring ... a continuous
water flow."
66. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978).
67. Id. at 718.
68. Id. at 702.
Winter 1990]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Due to the lengthy evolution of the reservation doctrine and because
the Mining Act and Desert Land Act did not define the scope of water
rights, state courts had to interpret the acts and doctrines without congres-
sional or United States Supreme Court guidance.69 In their interpretations,
various state courts developed differing theories as to the nature of the
United States' original proprietary interest in the waters of the West,
including the origin of state control over these waters."0
The Oregon Doctrine
The Oregon Doctrine originated in the case of Hough v. Porter7 decided
in 1909. In Hough, the Oregon Supreme Court adjudicated the rights of
all persons interested in the lands bordering Silver Creek. The issue was
whether and to what extent any of these persons were riparian owners.72
The court resolved this question in light of the Desert Land Act and its
effects.73 It concluded that the Desert Land Act severed the water from
the public lands so that a subsequent federal patent to land did not convey
any water rights. The court considered the act an expression of Congress's
intent to dedicate the waters for public use pursuant to state law.74
The United States Supreme Court essentially adopted this view in 1935
in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. (Beaver
Portland Cement).75 In this case, a landowner whose title derived from
a homestead patent acquired after the Desert Land Act of 1877 argued
that this patent carried with it a riparian right to the stream on which it
bordered. The Court focused primarily on the Desert Land Act and con-
cluded "if this language is to be given its natural meaning. . . it effected
a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appro-
priated, from the land itself. From that premise it follows that a patent
issued thereafter for lands in a desert state or territory . . . carried with
it.. .no common law right to the waters flowing through or bordering
upon the lands conveyed." 76 In sum, the Court held that the Desert Land
Act severed the waters of the public domain from the soil so that a federal
patent after 1877 conveyed rights to the land but not to the water which
was to be administered according to state law. Moreover, the Court further
held that the Desert Land Act did not impose a uniform rule of appro-
69. For a discussion of these various theories, which includes the California doctrine, the Oregon
doctrine and the Colorado doctrine, see Note, Federal-State Conflicts Over Control of Western Waters,
60 Colum. L. Rev. 968, 972-75 (1960).
70. Id. at 972; In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 895 cert. denied sub.
nom. California v. United States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988).
71. 51 Or. 318, 98 P. 1083 (1909).
72. id. at 1089.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1092-94; see Note, supra note 69 at 974.
75. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
76. Id. at 158; see Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
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priation." Thus, the holding gave the Western states the rule they had
always wanted, that each state could determine for itself which form of
water law to institute.78
California, however, developed a distinctly different analysis of the
impact of the Desert Land Act on the waters appurtenant to federal lands
other than that employed by Oregon in Hough.79
The California Doctrine (and Riparian Water Rights)
The basis for this doctrine is Lx v. Haggins° decided in 1886. This
case involved a dispute between riparian owners and appropriators of the
waters of the Kern River. Lux had acquired 100,000 acres of land bor-
dering the Kern River. Haggin had acquired lands above Lux which
included two canals for irrigation. Haggin extended one of the canals,
constructed a diversion dam, and diverted the entire river."' Lux argued
that his land grant from the United States carried with it riparian rights
and, therefore, he had an undiminished and unaltered right to the flow
of the Kern River. Haggin countered that the doctrine of prior appropri-
ation prevailed in California. 2
The court in Lux held riparian rights had not been abrogated and that,
although the Mining Act and Desert Land Act were held to have recog-
nized and affirmed vested appropriative rights acquired on public lands,
a patent of federal land in California granted under any statute other than
the Desert Land Act carried with it a grant of riparian rights subject only
to those appropriative rights that existed at the time of the patent. 3 The
Hallett Creek court relied heavily upon the California Doctrine, as set
forth in Lax, to reach its holding.
ANALYSIS
Decision of the Court
The California Supreme Court in Hallett Creek found that the United
States has an unexercised riparian water right under state law to use the
waters of the Hallett Creek System." The court began by emphasizing
that the United States Supreme Court recently re-affirmed Congress's
long established principle of deferring to state water law with respect to
77. California-Oregon v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 (1935).
78. Id.; F. Treilease, supra note 29 at 147g; see Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
79. See Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1886); see also Note, supra note 69 at 972-73.
80. 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1886).
81. Id. at 924-25. For a complete discussion of this case see Dunbar, supra note 54 at 65-70.
82. Lux 69 Cal. at 260-61, at 4 P 924-25.
83. Id. at 921-25.
84. In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 cert. denied sub. nom. California
v. United States, - U.S. -. , 109 S. Ct. 71 (1988).
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nonnavigable waters."5 The court turned to United States v. New Mexico
as support for this and quoted: "Where Congress has expressly addressed
the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it
has almost invariably deferred to the state law." 6 The Hallett Creek court
also observed that the reservation doctrine is an exception to Congress's
deferrence to state water law." In United States v. New Mexico, the United
States Supreme Court re-affirmed Congress' deference to state water law,
holding that the federal government could not claim a reserved water
right for secondary purposes on federal reserved lands." The Hallett Creek
court, however, noted that the claim made by the United States in United
States v. New Mexico was based on federal law, whereas in Hallett Creek,
the United States' water claim was based on state law. 9 To establish this
as a meaningful distinction, the court quoted United States v. New Mexico:
[wihere water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation
... there arises the ... inference that Congress intended, consistent
with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in
the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. (em-
phasis added by Hallett Creek court)"
This distinction served the court in two ways: 1) it meant the holding in
United States v. New Mexico did not foreclose the United States' claim
in Hallett Creek, and 2) it implied the United States, when seeking water
for secondary purposes, is to be treated as any other landowner who seeks
to acquire water. Consequently, the Hallett Creek court stated:
Although the State of New Mexico recognized only appropriative
rights, the underlying principle of deference to state water law log-
ically extends to any water right recognized under local law-in-
cluding riparian rights.9
The Hallett Creek court refused to employ California's interpretation that
when the United States Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico
stated that the federal enclave could "acquire water in the same manner
as any other public or private appropriator" it was speaking in specific
terms.92 That is, the Supreme Court meant that the United States must
use the law of prior appropriation when seeking water for secondary
85. Id. at 891-93.
86. Id. at 893 (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978)).
87. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)).
88. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 718.
89. Hallett Creek. 243 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
90. Id. (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978)).
91. Id. at 893 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 893-94.
93. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700-02. As an example of the State of
California's interpretation of the procedure that the United States must use (i.e., prior appropriation)
when seeking water for secondary purposes see State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988). Not-
withstanding a strong challenge by the Nevada Board of Agriculture, in this case the United States
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purposes on all federal reservations in the West.93 Instead, the Hallett
Creek court viewed the Court's language more generally to include any
applicable state water law. Notwithstanding California's specific inter-
pretation of the United States v. New Mexico decision, the Hallett Creek
court decided that the United States may claim riparian rights, under
California law, in lands which it holds for itself as the original owner.9,
The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
under California law, the United States has riparian rights in lands ac-
quired from a non-federal owner by purchase, condemnation, gift or
exchange." Although, the Ninth Circuit case re-emphasized that the United
States is to be treated as any other landowner, its holding is not dispositive
of the issue of whether the United States has riparian rights on lands it
has reserved for itself. Specifically, it leaves unanswered the question of
whether the Desert Land Act severed the United States' rights to water
on lands it holds as an original owner.
When the Hallett Creek court evaluated the impact of the Desert Land
Act on the United States' claim for riparian rights, it examined the history
of water law in California and other Western states. 96 As noted, the
interpretation of the impact of the Desert Land Act with respect to the
creation of the reservation doctrine has had a convoluted evolution. 97
Various courts formed differing theories as to the nature of the federal
government's original proprietary interest in the waters of the West and
the origin of state control over these waters.9" The Hallett Creek court
focused specifically upon the Oregon and California Doctrines to illustrate
these differing theories. 99 The court conceded that the doctrinal debate
was resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Beaver Portland
Cement, where it essentially adopted the Oregon Doctrine. " Beaver
Portland Cement held that the Desert Land Act effected a severance of
all waters upon the public domain from the land itself, so that a patent
issued for lands thereafter did not carry a common law right to the water
bordering the lands conveyed.' 0 '
The Hallett Creek court distinguished Beaver Portland Cement. First,
it observed that in Beaver Portland Cement the United States Supreme
Court stated that the Desert Land Act applied only to the public domain
acquired a water right for secondary purposes (i.e., instream flows) through the doctrine of prior
appropriation. It must be noted that United States v. New Mexico was neither cited nor relied upon
by the court in reaching its conclusion. The court did, however, cite to In re Water of Hallet Creek
System for support of the proposition that the United States is "entitled to equal treatment under
state water law." Id. at 268-69.
94. Hallet Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
95. Id. at 893-94 (citing California v. United States, 235 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1956)).
96. Id. at 894-98.
97. Note, supra note 69, at 972-75.
98. Id. at 972.
99. Halleu Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 894-98.
100. Id. at 897.
101. California-Oregon v. Beaver Portland Cement, 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935).
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and not reserved lands such as the Plumas National Forest.' 2 Second,
the Hallett Creek court noted that the high court rejected the argument
that the Desert Land Act had imposed a uniform rule of prior appropriation
for all Western states.'0 3 Instead, it felt the United States Supreme Court
recognized each state's power to determine to what extent the rule of
appropriation or common law rule of riparian rights will be used. "o The
Hallett Creek court pointed out that California has the option of applying
either the rule of appropriation or common law riparian rights (for ex-
ample, as in Lux) to these patents of land. Third, the court concluded
that Beaver Portland Cement was not dispositive of the issue before them
because that case considered the question of federal water rights of pa-
tentees on lands conveyed, and not those lands retained by the United
States.' Consequently, the court reasoned:
Nothing in [Beaver Portland Cement], [or] in the Desert Land Act
... undermines the principle, uniformly recognized in Lux ... that
riparian rights exist in federal lands located in California, as surely
as they inhere in private lands. We have never ... predicated the
recognition of riparian water rights on the identity of the riparian
owner....,06
Thus, the court re-emphasized that the United States is to be treated as
an ordinary landowner and that the California Doctrine, which holds that
sovereignty over the nonnavigable waters of the West passed to the states
as they were formed, remains applicable. 07 Consequently, the court rea-
soned and held that when California became a state in 1850 and adopted
the common law, which automatically recognizes riparian rights, the
United States possessed riparian rights under state law as owner of the
public lands."o Thus, nothing precludes the United States from claiming
water in California, not as a sovereign, but as an ordinary landowner
pursuant to state law.
Notably, the court held that the United States has riparian rights not
only on reserved lands but on all federal lands within California. "o The
court appears to have replaced the word "severance," as used in describing
the effect of the Desert Land Act on the public domain in Beaver Portland
Cement, with the word "subordinate."
Although the Desert land Act did not terminate the interests of the
federal government in the waters of the public domain, it did sub-
102. Hallett Creek, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 897-98.
106. Id. at 898.
107. Id. at 895-96.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 898.
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ordinate those interests to the rights of subsequent appropriators
recognized under state and local law."'
According to the Hallett Creek court, a severence only occurred when
the United States conveyed land. With respect to the public domain, "the
severance" merely subordinated the United States' riparian rights to the
rights of appropriators established under state law."' That is, the Desert
Land Act freed the water for settlers' use and gave the states control over
this water; California, by recognizing riparian rights, in turn, acknowl-
edged that the United States has these rights on all lands it held as a
proprietor. This analysis, however, appears incompatible with the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress's intent in Beaver
Portland Cement to make water available for settlement in the West. In
other words, the intent underlying the Desert Land Act was to relinquish
ownership and control over the nonnavigable waters of the West so that
the water would be available for the settlers use. California, by imme-
diately granting the United States a riparian right in these same waters,
negated the impact of the Desert Land Act, thereby frustrating congres-
sional intent.
Potential Impact of the Decision
Although the stare decisis effect of the Hallett Creek decision is binding
only in California, its reasoning could survive other Western states' scru-
tiny." '2 In Hallett Creek the court relied upon the California Doctrine and
the fact the United States is to be treated as an ordinary landowner. Other
states recognize and rely upon the California Doctrine." 3 The impact of
these other states determining that the United States may claim a riparian
water right on all federal lands within their borders is not immediately
apparent.
As for those states which recognize only appropriative rights, the po-
tential impact of the court's decision requires further analysis. It is im-
portant to recognize that the Hallett Creek court concluded the water
rights of the federal government accrued through its ownership of riparian
lands by the initial creation of such rights by state law." 4 In other words,
110. Id. (emphasis added).
I11. Id.
112. See e.g. State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988). For a discussion on the soundness of
both the Hallett Creek and Morros decisions see Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquistion
of Water Rights: A Federal Practitioner's Point of View, 19 Pac. L.J. 1324 (1988).
113. Chandler, Elements of Western Water Law, I1, 12 (Rev. ed. 1918). States which recognize
both riparian and appropriative rights, often called the "California Doctrine" are: Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Washington.
Western states which recognize only appropriative rights, often called the "Colorado Doctrine" are:
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. I Hutchins, Water
Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, 6-14 (1971 ed.).
114. Hallett Creek. 243 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96,
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as states were formed they possessed the power to determine the water
rights that attached to federal lands. Consequently, according to Hallett
Creek, state law is to be evaluated at the date states were formed. Logically
extended, the state law which applies to federal reservations is that which
governed at the date the reservation was created.
For example, when New Mexico and Arizona entered the Union in
1912, both recognized the common law rights to groundwater. The com-
mon law rule of groundwater is the rule of capture. "5 In 1931, New
Mexico replaced the common law property rights to groundwater with
the law of prior appropriation." 6 Likewise, in 1926, Arizona held that
the rights to groundwater were subject to the law of prior appropriation. 7
However, by this time, the majority of national forests (that is, federal
reservations) had already been created pursuant to the Organic Act of
1897. ' Consequently, in light of the Hallett Creek decision, the United
States may have common law rights to groundwater which vested at the
times New Mexico and Arizona became states. Thus, because the Arizona
and New Mexico law which applied at the date the reservations were
created was the common law, it is conceivable that the United States may
still exercise these common law groundwater rights according to the
Hallett Creek reasoning.
Assuming that the United States has water rights that existed since the
creation of the states and that it is to be treated as an ordinary landowner,
an issue arises as to whether a subsequent change in a state's law will
affect these pre-existing water rights. That is, this reasoning gives rise
to the issue of whether the United States' common law water rights, which
vested at statehood, survived Arizona's and New Mexico's subsequent
changes in law with respect to groundwater. This is a difficult question
because unlike an ordinary landowner, property held by the United States
can neither be condemned nor taken by adverse possession. Note that the
underlying theme of the Hallett Creek court's analysis is premised on the
fact the United States is to be treated as an ordinary landowner. Fortunately
for the Hallett Creek court, the State of California has made no major
changes with respect to its recognition of common law riparian rights
and, thus, was not faced with this issue. Therefore, the issue of whether
a state granted water right to the United States can be taken away by a
subsequent change in state law is a question which remains unanswered
by the Hallett Creek decision.
115. State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc., 63 Wis.2d 278, 287, 217 N.W.2d 339, 348
(1974).
116. Act approved March 16, 1927, ch. 182, 1927 N.M. Laws 450-51; see Yeo v. Tweedy, 34
N.M. 611, 288 P. 970 (1929). For a detailed discussion of the creation of this legislation see Dunbar,
supra note 54 at 162-91.
117. Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor. 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
118. Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34, 16 U.S.C. §473 et seq.
(1976 ed.)
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CONCLUSION
The Hallett Creek decision re-opens the question of the impact of the
Desert Land Act upon the nonnavigable waters of the West, an issue once
thought to be settled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Beaver Portland Cement. In addition, this holding raises the issue of
whether the United States may be treated as an ordinary landowner thereby
receiving benefits from state law, and, if so, whether subsequent changes
in state law can deprive the United States of these benefits. Consequently,
the Hallett Creek decision creates more questions than it answers. It
remains to be seen how subsequent decisions answer them.
MARK BASHAM
